commercial monopolies, forced labour, and capital transfers to the metropole. Causes of violence which also marked other colonial regimes were pushed firmly into the background 4 . The account of the violent birth of colonial rule in the Congo basin offered here nuances this ascribed exceptionalism (though it does not minimize the terror) and facilitates the reintegration of the EIC into the broader historiography of, firstly, the global impact of European colonial expansion and, secondly, Central Africa"s turbulent history in the longue durée.
The argument is divided into five sections. Following a general outline of the EIC"s violent system of administration ( §1), a discussion of its social and demographic impact (and the controversy which surrounds it) brings out the need for more regionally focused and context sensitive studies ( §2). The dispute surrounding demographics is also useful in highlighting that what is fundamentally at stake is the place extreme violence in a colonial setting should occupy in the history of European "modernity". Approaches which hinge on Leopoldian exceptionalism and top-down economic imperatives alone are particularly unhelpful in clarifying this issue: §3 relates how such approaches came to dominate the distinct historiographical traditions which emerged in Belgium, Leopold"s successor as a colonial power between 1908 and 1960, and abroad. In §4 the causes underlying the EIC"s violent nature are explored in more detail, adding some flesh to the argument that mass violence was a complex and multilayered phenomenon. While state actors remain in the limelight, the focus here shifts from the state as a singular, normative agent, towards what Christian Gerlach has labelled an "extremely violent society" in which various individuals and social groups within and outside of the state committed violent acts for multiple reasons 5 . Some of the arguments advanced are, by necessity, general, tentative or patchy: a discussion of available source material with which historians can fill some of the gaps ( §5) concludes this article. 4 Moves by humanitarians to maintain the special status of the Congo Atrocities in the context of other dubious colonial practices are discussed in Grant, A Civilized Savagery. Attempts to break this mould can be found in Vellut, 'La Violence Armée" and Breman, Imperial Monkey Business.
General outline
5 C. Gerlach, 'Extremely Violent Societies: an Alternative to the Concept of Genocide', Journal of Genocide Research, 8, 4 (2006) , 455-71. power usually depended on its delegation to local rulers and mercenaries restyled as allied chiefs, several of whom retained considerable independence and coercive capabilities 17 .
Within this institutional framework the EIC organised the forceful extraction of natural resources, foodstuffs and labour. A weak capital base, largely limited to Leopold"s personal input, coupled with King"s desire to finance his costly imperial projects from local taxation led to a continuous drive to cut expenses and increase revenue 18 . In face of the paucity of taxable economic activity the state routinely turned to tribute collecting and forced labour as a way to marry both objectives 19 . Moreover, limited finance forced local government posts into an increasingly parasitic relationship with their environment while at the same time loosening their ties with the central administration. Regular levies of foodstuffs and labour for porterage and other services were widespread but varied in intensity with the local state presence, hitting the Lower Congo district hardest 20 .
Imposed as an obligation, the quantity and timing of such levies were left to the discretion of state officials, their collection in many cases taking the form of razzias. In the Upper Congo, the forceful appropriation of stocks of ivory proved another useful way of complementing state and private incomes 21 . For several years, recruitment for the colonial army relied heavily on the "liberation" of slaves (enlistment of prisoners of war)
in the East as a way to reduce its bill 22 .
The impact of such measures on the EIC"s budget deficits was little more than palliative until it capitalized fully on the global rubber boom 23 . The "rubber regime" found its origin in a combination of a surge in the metropolitan demand for rubber, the development of a legal framework and justifying discourse in Brussels, and an increase in the state"s extractive capacity 24 . Forced labour was presented as a form of taxation, justifiable in the absence of a monetary economy by the principle that colonized peoples should bear the cost of their own administration and civilization. The legal theory of state ownership of vacant lands was invoked in 1891 to appropriate the vast majority of the country"s rubber-bearing forests; large sections were subsequently leased to private concession companies, such as the infamous Abir and Anversoise, in which the state retained a large financial interest 25 . In combination, both principles legally transformed much of the country into an enormous plantation on which Africans were obliged to harvest rubber in payment of their taxes. The claim of state ownership over the country"s main rubber districts also excluded European traders from much of the potentially lucrative rubber trade, provoking protests from European commercial circles which formed the nucleus from which later a humanitarian reform movement developed 26 .
The everyday reality of rubber exploitation was defined less by such legal underpinnings than by the methods used to obtain high levels of production. The triple limitations of an underdeveloped state structure, the large size of the rubber area and a thinly spread 406-12. 24 While the legal framework and moral justification for forced labour were developed in Brussels, it would be worth exploring to what extent they were shaped by ideas formulated by local administrators based on their experience of African labour and local methods of surplus extraction. 25 The reliance on concession companies to develop the colonial estate was yet another way to minimize costs. It was a feature of cash-strapped administrations throughout the region. For the French Congo, see C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, Le Congo au Temps des Grandes Compagnies Concessionnaires, 1898 -1930 (Paris: Mouton, 1972 , for Mozambique L. Vail, 'Mozambique's Chartered Companies: the Rule of the Feeble', Journal of African History, 17, 3 (1976) , 389-416. 26 S. J. S. Cookey, Britain and the Congo Question, 1885 -1913 (London: Longmans, 1968 , 1885 -1903 ', African Economic History, 12 (1983 , 125-139; Vellut, "La Violence Armée"; Vellut, "Réflexions"; Northrup, "The Ending of Slavery".
29 Robert Harms offers this description of the system in operation in the Abir territory (Equateur District): "the rubber agent made a list of all the men in the villages under his control, giving each man a quota of four kilos of dry rubber (eight kilos of liquid rubber) per fortnight. To oversee the collection he placed armed sentries, who were often former slaves, in the villages. The sentries, who lived in luxury at the expense of the villagers, made sure that each man collected his quota. They flogged, imprisoned, or shot villagers who fell behind […] Abir apparently had little difficulty containing resistance during the first decade of its rule. Each post kept a force of about eighty men armed with modern Albini rifles to put down resistance or punish villages that lagged behind in their quotas. To crush large-scale rebellions, the State kept a large force at Basankusu that could reach any part of the Abir territory by river steamer within a few days after being called by a rubber agent", R. W. company posts was steadily increased in order to extend the area brought under production. From a budgetary perspective the system was a success: by the turn of the century financial deficits had given way to sizeable surpluses 33 .
While coercion was a central feature of labour mobilization throughout the EIC, the relative autonomy of administrators and company agents coupled with variations in local circumstances, such as relations with African elites and the type and quantity of produce claimed, led to significant regional differences in the methods of tribute collection and, consequently, the violence involved 34 . However, the latitude enjoyed by the men on the spot was circumscribed by incessant administrative pressure and pecuniary incentives aimed at increasing production, often leading to spiralling violence and ruthless overexploitation 35 . In time, this chaotic reality of unchecked local plunder machines was streamlined into a legal framework which gradually subjected labour requisition to rules and procedures. In November 1903 a limit of 40 hours of forced labour per month per adult African was decreed, although it was coupled with a complex system of equivalences in produce which still allowed for considerable elasticity in practice. The most brutal forms of repression were outlawed and others were more strictly regulated.
The practical effect of these regulations was limited due to inadequate means of enforcement together with the Brussels administration"s clear message that refinement of the legal framework was intended to regularize, not reform, existing practice, and that revenues should therefore continue to increase 36 .
In part, the definition and narrowing of the boundaries of legitimate violence in the EIC"s legal system were a response to international humanitarian action and political pressure challenging both the morality and the legality of Leopold"s administration. (New York: Longman, 1983 ), 1-26. The chronology of libeli rituals, which Nancy Rose Hunt uses as a prism through which periods of intense strain on Lokele authority structures can be identified, shows how amongst the Lokele incursions by the Swahili, EIC forces and the Belgian colonial administration were experienced as different waves of colonial occupation: Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon, 27-79. In an ironic comment upon to colonial state"s abolitionist pretentions, the Mbole branded EIC officials Atama-Atama, the name previously given to the slave raiders from which they had alledgedly been liberated: Likaka, Naming Colonialism, 102-5. mobilization was rationalized, new economic sectors appeared and the gravest forms of physical abuse were gradually curtailed, leading to a new set of constraints and limited possibilities for social mobility and increased wealth 48 . Changes in the exercise of state power were significant, but coercion and systematic violence were never purged from a colonial system which cemented racial inequality, stifled African initiative and furthered the forceful integration of its subjects at the bottom tier of the economic system 49 .
Social and demographic impact and the vexed question of modernity
As established above, the intensity, substance and impact of European occupation varied across regions and evolved over time. Gewald, "More than Red Rubber". Hunt, "An Acoustic Register" notes, rightly, that percentages are more reliable than absolute numbers. Population piramids from later periods also provide clues. 55 State sources are, for example, largely silent on casualties resulting from punative expeditions, eufimistically called promenades ("walks"). Ngbwapkwa, 'L'Exploitation du Caoutchouc", 298. 
While generally impressionistic on demographics, travellers to the Lower and Upper
Congo in the early 20 th Century were distinctly alarmist: they described severe hardship and decimation of the African population devastating entire districts 58 . Whether this population decline was due to high mortality, low natality, migration, or a combination of these is not always clear. What is certain is that the crisis was widespread and severe, and by no means confined to the rubber areas. A more refined historical geography is still needed which relates the experiences of trauma, demographic decline and social change within Congolese societies to the uneven development of the EIC"s political and economic structures.
It is impossible to neatly distinguish the impact of the different scourges of famine, disease, warfare, forced labour and state violence which ravaged the African population.
Nonetheless, here too a completely agnostic attitude should be avoided. Minimalists have correctly pointed out that demographic decline was by no means the direct result of violence alone 59 . The epidemics which swept the region, sleeping sickness and smallpox in particular, had a particularly severe effect. Failed harvests caused several famines. The spread of "moral evils" such as venereal disease and alcoholism and the low birth rate of Congolese women, two issues which preoccupied missionaries and colonial officials alike, point to the experience of severe trauma and social problems unleashed or exacerbated by the colonial encounter 60 . This multiplicity of causes has been used to argue that the demographic deficit of the early colonial period was only marginally related to the "Congo atrocities" and state violence 61 . While this point has some validity, the "collateral damage" of epidemics and malnutrition was not unrelated to the forced known as "Ipanga Ngunda" ("he who destroys the country"). Ngbwapkwa, 'L'Exploitation du Caoutchouc", 298; Likaka, Naming Colonialism, 85-7.
labour regime 62 . Scorched earth tactics, plunder, population displacement, exhaustion, neglect of farms due to tax obligations as well as unhealthy working conditions considerably (but immeasurably) increased Africans" susceptibility to famine and disease.
Moreover, famine and disease have their own geographies, and sharp demographic decline has equally been noted in areas which were unaffected by the major epidemics 63 .
The heated debate over population decline, with critiques of demographic data bordering on the obsessive, concerns more than figures alone. Minimalists generally recognise that even a serious downward revision of the estimated 10 million victims forwarded by
Morel, Hochschild and others does not substantially alter the picture of a brutal colonial system engendering widespread violence, death and devastation -even if they tend to confine the most serious excesses to the "red rubber" episode alone 64 . What they do take issue with is the association with genocide and the Holocaust which a demographic crisis of this proportion evokes. Drawing on Joseph Conrad and Hannah Arendt, Sven
Lindqvist has popularized an approach which sees colonialism as the prime expression of modernity"s capacity for evil and a laboratory for genocidal, exterminatory ideologies 65 .
In Lindqvist"s account the EIC is transformed from a dysfunctional, brutal colonial system based on the exploitation of forced labour into the first and major instance of mass violence of the Twentieth century. The view that the decimation of native peoples around the globe can be at least partly attributed to genocidal tendencies at the heart of the western intellectual tradition is not uncommon amongst historians of American and Oceanic aboriginal societies, but the extension of the argument to the EIC is relatively new and remains contested 66 .
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Three objections are advanced against the incorporation of the EIC into such a narrative on the modernity of mass violence: (1) no premeditated large-scale extermination took place, (2) the roots of violence were at least partially endogenous, and (3) reducing colonialism to racism, greed, and violence ignores the ideas of moral and material improvement which constituted the European "civilizing mission" 67 . These points are worthy of consideration. It is particularly the case that, in a discourse whose underlying purpose is not the study of the colonial encounter itself but the critical questioning of European modernity, the extent to which colonial violence was fundamentally shaped by dynamics in the contact zone, and not merely acted out in it, threatens to get lost 68 .
Acknowledging such complexities does not however preclude the existence of important An important blind spot is the active participation in (and experience of) violence by Africans, and the often locally generated tensions which produced these. The approach"s Eurocentric periodization also veils much lived experience, privileging suffering at the hands of colonial agents over pre-colonial violence and ignoring the continuities in administrative practice following Belgian annexation and legal reforms as well as, crucially, the difficult processes of coping with trauma and re-integrating victims and perpetrators into society. Vellut, "Prestige et Pauvreté"; Hunt, "An Acoustic Register". The connection between economic development ("modernization") and exterminatory violence is encapsulated in the concept of "developmental genocide". See H. greed and the EIC"s legal system are ill-suited to the purpose. It is to the dominance of such perspectives that we now turn.
Historiography and the dominance of top-downism
Past and present interpretations of mass violence in the EIC are dominated by the figure of Leopold II, the personification of greed, presiding as absolutist monarch over a machinery of death aimed at squeezing extortionate quantities of rubber out of his This section offers seven perspectives on the state of violence surrounding Congo"s colonial encounter with Europe. Individually, these are part-explanations of a complex phenomenon; taken together they point to ways of moving beyond the top-down approach which attributes its occurrence to a particular legal system or Leopold"s rotten personality. This list of causes is merely a starting point for a more refined historical analysis: the task of reconstructing how, in different parts of the EIC and at different times, they interacted to produce specific historical outcomes still lies ahead. The 93 Gewald, "More than Red Rubber". In so conceptualizing colonial violence, I draw inspiration from Gerlach, "Extremely Violent Societies" and Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism".
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The term "state" in its singular, normative form -as used here for the sake of brevity and clarity-obscures the existence of a complex and hierarchic state bureaucracy, which renders the duality between the state and its local representatives somewhat problematic. The legislative and executive branch (respectively in Brussels and Congo) did contribute to the escalation of violence in different ways, but in the important case of the rubber regime the use of extreme violence was at least in some cases ordered by high ranking officials in the executive branch (such as the Vice Gouverneur Général or Commissaire de District) -an observation which somewhat qualifies my statement that mass violence in the EIC was not centrally planned. See Stengers, "The Congo Free State", 280-1 for the differing responsibility of the legislative and executive branch. For the organisation of the rubber system see Vangroenweghe argument here mainly concerns the need to embed the colonial state within its widest possible context.
Political culture and the establishment of sovereignty
The implantation of the colonial state and the assertion of its sovereign rights involved military conquest and the elimination of powerful competitors. The assertion of dominance was a drawn out, mediated and often truncated process 96 . However, even though control remained superficial in some parts, and was "delegated" to allied chiefs and warlords in others, the logic of the colonial state legitimized and necessitated a number of interventions, notably the raising of revenue and the subjection of the African population to the rule of law. The identification of the state interest with its own survival and expansion and the implementation of a loosely defined model of development sensitive to metropolitan needs, helped define the contours of legitimate violence 97 . As "good" colonial government entailed the successful enforcement of a legal system designed to bring about the desired social transformation, the state entitled itself to use its military power and machinery of criminal punishment to settle conflicts over land, labour, the direction of trade, tax obligations and production methods 98 .
In the eyes of EIC officials and European opinion, a powerful civilizing discourse which presented colonial domination as a precondition for Africa"s social, cultural and economic improvement provided the ultimate justification for the culture of violence it engendered. Such ideas enabled the rationalization of violence as being supportive of the greater good and led the administration to accept high worker mortality and disruptive recruitment practices as the inevitable costs of progress 99 . No less important for being 96 Ndaywel, Histoire Général, 280; Stengers and Vansina, "King Leopold"s Congo".
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The "development plan" mainly consisted of unlocking Congo"s labour power, stimulating primary exports, developing a rudimentary infrastructure, guaranteeing secure title to land and property to European investors, and enforcing civil order. These "normal" features of EIC policy have not received much attention in a historiography dominated by the (atypical) rubber system which grew primarily out of the imperative of state survival. For a broad view, see A. G. Hopkins, "The "New International Economic Order" in the Nineteenth Century: Britain's First Development Plan for Africa" in R. Law, ed, From Slave Trade to 'Legitimate' Commerce: The Commercial Transition in Nineteenth-Century West Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 240-64. 98 Krozewski, "Contextualising Violence", 58.
99 On the post-liberal refusal to accept "modernity" as the good which redeems colonial violence, see Moses, "Conceptual Blockages". Also see Mark Levene"s suggestion that "colonialism may have been inherently incompatible with its lofty aims", Levene, Genocide, 239. inadequately understood is the impact of the imperial elite"s social Darwinian worldview, in which the domination of "inferior" races was naturalised and seen as crucially important to the strength and survival of the Belgian "race" 100 .
Ruthless economic exploitation
Revenue collection and labour mobilization were the most visible, pervasive and disruptive aspects of the colonial administration. The crucial importance of rubber to the state"s solvency accounts for both the intensity of its exploitation, and the prominence of the "rubber regime" in explanations of the mass violence sweeping the region. The rapid development of wild rubber exploitation in the EIC was part of an international speculative rubber boom which also affected producers in the rainforests of Latin America and other African colonies 101 . King Leopold fully capitalized on the opportunities world demand for rubber offered him to improve the state"s precarious finances and to fulfil his private imperial ambitions 102 . The relentless pressure he personally exerted on his subordinates to increase production, and a perverse system of bonuses which rewarded the excesses of state and concession company agents, spurred on a ruthless and deadly scramble for revenue.
Following the analysis of Edmund Dene Morel, leader of the Congo Reform Association and a prolific writer, the legal system by which the state obtained forced tax labour to work the "vacant" lands which it appropriated dominates explanations of its violent outcome. To Morel, the crucial issue was access to land: the EIC"s seizure of the rubber forests implied the substitution of freely enacted and mutually beneficial trade 100
For the argument that the social darwinistic outlook of imperial elites could render violence "necessary" see Levene, "Empires", 199 and Krozewski, "Contextualising Violence". The mental horizon of the Belgian, metropolitan colonial elite is explored in Viaene, "King Leopold"s Imperialism". The brutality of the EIC"s regime was linked to a more complex process of interaction with, and adaptation to, local circumstances. In its most general sense, this represented the articulation of capitalist expansion with indigenous modes of production and distribution 106 . Europeans were hampered in their search for wage labour and revenues by the limited commodification of social relationships in the societies they encountered, and the ease by which those who preferred not to engage in production for the market could avoid doing so through subsistence production, flight, or migration 107 . Explanations for
Africans" reluctance to engage in the kind of market production colonial governments desired centred on the idea of the "lazy native", which was used to justify forced labour as an educational measure 108 . To organise the profitable extraction of natural resources under these circumstances, EIC officials resorted to copying and adapting the social organisation and terror tactics of the Eastern slave trade 109 .
3. Under-capitalization and state weakness 103 Most succinctly argued in E. D. Morel, "The "Commercial" Aspect of the Congo Question", Journal of the Royal African Society, 3, 12 (1904) , 430-48, but also see Morel, Red Rubber. The legal appropriation of "vacant" land was of paramount importance, but the state did not, and could not, in practice separate Africans from the land they held. The legal appropriation of land was enforced through a ban on selling its produce, and did not include lands used for subsistence agriculture. 104 Breman, Imperial Monkey Business.
105 See Likaka, Rural Society and Cotton; Likaka, Naming Colonialism.
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Cooper, "Africa and the World Economy". . The state"s shortage of funds lay at the basis of both a fanatical drive to generate short-term revenue to finance colonial conquest and occupation and a reduction of expenditure to a bare minimum. Even after 1895, when the state"s financial outlook had improved markedly as a result of the rubber boom, the administration continued to be starved of much needed resources as a result of Leopold"s decision to reserve substantial sums for his imperial projects and self-aggrandizement 111 .
Such economizing had far-reaching consequences for the make-up of the state. The An undercapitalized EIC, then, possessed the determination and capacity to extract considerable resources from its territory, but lacked the ability (and arguably the will) to control the means by which such extraction occurred. It was this combination of official preoccupation with revenue and the absence of an effective civil administration which to influential observers such as Lord Cromer, Wilfred Thesiger and Félicien Cattier lay at the core of the "maladministration" of the EIC 115 .
African resistance
Africans did not passively submit to the EIC"s claim to sovereign rights or its demands for labour and produce, and it was mostly through the brutal repression of such resistance that the latent violence of colonial rule and impressments of involuntary labour became overt. Contrary to the myth of peaceful occupation propagated by Belgian colonial discourse, "primary resistance" from African rulers refusing to submit to European rule necessitated a prolonged war of conquest which outlasted the EIC 116 . In areas where the state"s military dominance was established, Africans continued to resist its demands for 113 The terminology is derived from F. Cooper, 'Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History', American Historical Review, 99, 5 (1994) , 1516-45. Stengers and Vansina, "King Leopold"s Congo".
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Vellut, "La Violence Armée".
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Osborne, "Wilfred G. Thesiger"; F. Cattier, Etude sur la Situation. The degree of violence required to contain the enduring unrest and quell the resistance to the state"s labour demands did much to expose the emptiness of the civilizing discourse on which its legitimacy depended 121 . Africans testified in great numbers before state officials, judicial officers, missionaries and the Commission d"Enquête 122 . The stark contrast between the presumed moral and material benefits of colonial rule and the systemic terror which these witnesses described provided sufficient ammunition for an international humanitarian campaign to successfully challenge Leopold"s rule. By refusing to submit to the EIC"s exploitative practices, Africans had played an important part in this process 123 .
Interaction with African societies and political structures
Resistance was but one of the ways in which Africans engaged with European expansion.
Differences, divisions and conflicts between and among African ethnic and social groups 117 Likaka, "Rural protest". 120 Consider, for an extreme example, the following quote from a letter by Jules Jacques, Commissaire de District at Lake Leopold II, a high ranking state official, to his subordinate Chef de Poste: "Decidedly, these people from Inongo are filthy scum. They have come to cut down the rubber vines at Ibali. We need to beat them into absolute submission or complete extinction […] Warn them that if they cut down another vine, I will exterminate them to the last man". 121 Likaka, Naming Colonialism.
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As a result, African voices are present in the colonial archive. Hunt, "An Acoustic Register". 123 Likaka, Naming Colonialism.
were fundamental to shaping the patterns of resistance and collaboration, mutual adaptation and intercultural exchange which defined the colonial encounter and the violence which accompanied it 124 . Explanations of the mass violence of the EIC era need to take into account such pre-existing social and political configurations and dynamics as well as the ways in which these were exploited by Europeans and their continued evolution in interaction with the colonial state.
During the second half of the 19 th century the Congo Basin was the locus of dramatic social change 125 . Historians have documented migrations and conquests, increased social stratification, disintegration of large political units and attempts by ambitious leaders to forge new ones, transformations in and intensification of slavery systems, a marked militarization of societies, intensified competition for wealth and power and changes in gender patterns. The societies the EIC tried to contain within its borders were neither unified nor uniform, nor were they isolated from each other or the outside world. Many of the region"s dynamics were related to the incorporation of large parts of it as raiding frontiers into Africa"s expansive slave trading networks 126 . Although long-distance trade in ivory and slaves brought considerable wealth to some, its effects on the frontier regions in the Congo were mostly destructive, generating a climate of generalized warfare, deep divisions, antagonism and extreme violence.
As the EIC sought allies and collaborators through which to solidify its power, it was drawn into and exploited these conflicts and rivalries. While the abolitionist discourse deployed in Europe prescribed the active suppression of the slave trade and the protection of its victims, military and political expediency, as well as cultural preferences, more often led to the establishment of collaborative relations with dominant groups and conquering slavers 127 . Rather than being abolished, slavery systems and inequalities in 124 Vansina, Paths in the Rainforest.
125 See Birmingham, Central Africa for an introduction. Over time the EIC"s conquest and military dominance eroded the power of the country"s ruling elites. However, this effect was not always immediately apparent, and in some cases enterprising Africans were able to consolidate or expand their wealth and power through political alliances with the state 130 . The outcome was an uneven distribution of burdens and opportunities. The more powerful leaders were able to mediate the incorporation of their subjects into the colonial order and mitigate some of its effects, often by shifting the burden of the EIC"s demands for labour and produce to their weaker neighbours and subjected peoples. Elsewhere, the Afro-Arab "sentry system", involving the stationing of armed state auxiliaries inside village communities, was widely adopted.
Often, these sentries exploited their position of state-backed power to appropriate wealth, wives, and sexual services, while their usurpation of local political power hampered the negotiated, indirect exercise of state power on the long term 131 .
Perpetrator motivation and character
Even though the extraction of labour and resources was at the heart of EIC state violence, the atrocities committed were not the result of measured economic rationality alone. State and company agents and their auxiliaries were more than profit-maximizing stick-figures increasing levels of brutality in a calculated response to financial bonuses for increased 128 Northrup, "The Ending of Slavery".
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Vellut, "La Violence Armée"
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Vanhee, "Over Heren en Knechten".
131 An account of the sentry system in operation in Katanga is given in a letter by the Scottish missionary Dugald Campbell in Morel, King Leopold's Rule, . These African auxiliaries are understudied: their origin, role and subsequent re-integration into society deserves further scrutiny. At times, they appear to have been drawn from dominant groups, building upon existing patterns of domination, while on other occasions they may have been merely locals faced with the unenviable choice of being "among the hunters or the hunted". See Hunt, "An Acoustic Register". Gewald, "More than Red Rubber", Breman, Imperial Monkey Business, Taussig, "Culture of Terror".
133 Baron Nisco, Acting President of the Court of Appeal at Boma, noted in December 1903 that the violence which Europeans, including state officials, routinely inflicted upon Africans had no legal basis whatsoever. Coercion and corporal punishment were used arbitrarily to uphold the power and prestige of European officials and civilians alike partially because a legal framework encapsulating the reality of racial domination and forced labour was lacking. Such violence, while illegal, had to be tolerated since the legal system provided Europeans with insufficient means to impose their will on "unwilling natives". such perceived shortcomings linked into essentialist conceptions of race, nationality or class. Doubts were cast over the colonial aptitudes of the Belgian "race", while the petty bourgeois background of the lower ranks of the state machinery equally raised questions about their fitness to rule. Lack of "character" (a concept closely related to ideals of masculinity) was held to cause Europeans to succumb to the degenerative and brutalizing effects of the African climate, environment and people
138
. The most common "genetic" explanation of violence, however, concerned African auxiliaries and native troops which, if inadequately supervised, were argued to be prone to surrender to their "savage instincts" 139 .
While the explanatory value of "character" to the problem of mass violence is limited at best, the EIC did experience difficulties in attracting suitable personnel due to high mortality rates, undesirable working conditions, modest wages and the low prestige of the Congolese colonial service 140 . As a result, recruitment standards were low and discredited personnel were retained to complement the structurally understaffed administration. A rapid turnover in personnel, the lack of education for colonial service and the loose ties Africans, leading to the development of close and sometimes intimate relationships between them. Cutting across this pluriformity of attitudes and interactions, however, fundamentally uneven power relations, racial inequality codified in law, and the twin ideas of white superiority and the legitimacy of European dominion remained unquestioned.
Sources
The were the most numerous group of Europeans residing in the EIC. As missionaries were also less concentrated in the urban areas of the Lower Congo, they were the most prominent European observers of, and participants in, developments in the interior 156 .
Unsurprisingly, this privileged position implicated missionaries directly in the Congo atrocity campaign as their testimony and endorsement was much coveted by humanitarians and the state alike. The decision to participate on either side of the debate mostly depended on strategic considerations related to evangelisation, which remained the missionary societies" primary concern 157 . Public interventions by missionaries were thus somewhat skewed to favour the missionary cause: critics were keen to present the excesses of Leopoldian colonialism as evidence of the shortcomings of a materialistic colonialism in need of moral improvement through increased missionary involvement.
However, missionary evidence is by no means limited to such public pronouncements.
Missionary archives contain a wealth of internal correspondence and detailed reports which provide information not only on the missionaries and their daily lives, but also on the social, political and economic context in which they operated and on the people they tried to convert. The writings of two prominent missionaries, Émeri Cambier (Scheut)
and Fernand Allard (Jesuit), which are available in published form, provide just a taste of the richness of this missionary evidence, as does a recent compilation of correspondence by American Presbyterian missionaries 158 .
Other interesting sources include the consular reports which provided foreign powers with the ammunition they needed to exert diplomatic pressure on King Leopold, as well as the correspondence originating from foreign diplomatic representatives residing in the for the information it provides on the EIC administration, but it was but the first of a series of more detailed and analytical reports written by an extended British consular staff during the decade which followed 160 Taken together, a detailed examination of this rich archival record and the possibilities for recovering African experience allow for a much fuller appreciation of both the complexity and brutality of the colonial encounter than the one provided by the current state-centred literature. The dragging of the EIC from under Leopold"s shadow and its reintegration into the broader historiography on European expansion and African adaptations to colonial rule is both possible and long overdue.
Rivières Equatoriales (partie 2)', Annales Aequatoria, 17 (1996) , 7-415. The Centre Aequatoria has a very informative website (www.aequatoria.be).
